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Abstract 
Multi-Agent Simulation (MAS) models are intended to capture emergent properties 
of  complex  systems  that  are  not  amenable  to  equilibrium  analysis.  They  are 
beginning to see some use for analysing agricultural systems. The paper reports on 
work in progress to create a MAS for specific sectors in New Zealand agriculture. 
One part of the paper focuses on options for modelling land and other resources such 
as  water,  labour  and  capital  in  this  model,  as  well  as  markets  for  exchanging 
resources  and commodities. A second part considers options  for modelling agent 
heterogeneity, especially risk preferences of farmers, and the impacts on decision-
making. The final section outlines the MAS that the authors will be constructing over 
the  next  few  years  and  the  types  of  research  questions  that  the  model  will  help 
investigate. 
 
Keywords: multi-agent simulation models, modelling, agent-based model, cellular 
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 Introduction  
 
Agent-based  models  have  become  a  popular  method  of  modelling  complex  real 
world systems in the land based sector. These systems range from cattleherders’ in 
North Cameroon (Rouchier et al., 2001), to deforestation/ afforestation in Indiana 
(Hoffmann et al., 2002) to farming in the German region of Hohenlohe (Balmann et 
al., 2002).  
This paper focuses on parts of an agent-based model for the Rural Futures FRST 
research programme in New Zealand, which is a 5-year FRST funded collaboration 
of AgReserach, Lincoln University, Otago University and others. The Rural Futures 
programme includes the creation of an industry level multi-agent simulation (MAS) 
model of New Zealand’s pastoral industries. This model will describe the strategic 
decisions  and  behaviours  of  individual  farmers  in  response  to  changes  in  their 
operating  environment,  and  link  to  the  production,  economic  and  environmental 
impacts of their management.  The MAS will need to represent the heterogeneity that 
exists in farmers, their systems, their responses to interventions and environmental 
changes, and the resultant consequences for the industry.  The MAS will provide an 
objective tool to assist strategy and policy setters to learn about the behaviour of this 
complex socio-economic/biophysical system before they intervene. 
MAS models allow the possibility of generating system dynamics without focussing 
on  an  equilibrium  solution.  MAS  models  provide  the  opportunity  to  assist  in 
understanding likely emergent properties of complex systems. They are intended to 
capture these emergent properties, which are not amenable to equilibrium analysis. 
Agent Based Models are most appropriate for systems characterised by a high degree 
of localisation and distribution and dominated by discrete decisions.  
Many  MAS  models  have  been  developed  for  understanding  and  modelling  land 
based systems, e.g., AgriPoliS (Happe et al. 2006), MPMAS (Berger et al, 2007) and 
SYPRIA  (Manson,  2005).  The  structures  of  these  models  are  varied,  but  can  be 
exemplified using an actor–institution–environment conceptual model as in SYPRIA 
(Manson,  2005).  In  such  a  modelling  system,  key  actors  (agent)  are  farmers  or 
households.  The  environment  defines  the  actors’  bio-geophysical  context  (e.g., 
climate  and  soil),  and  institutions  (other  agent  types,  e.g.,  regional  councils,  the 
market,  and  RMA)  guide  actors’  decision  making.  Three  major  processes  are 
sequentially  executed  during  each  simulation  time  step:  (1)  Institutions  change 
variables related to  actor decision making (e.g., policy change); (2) Environment 
changes  according  to  endogenous  ecological  rules  (e.g.,  climate  change)  and  the 
effects of actor decision making during the previous time step; and (3) each actor in 
the  region  makes  land-use  decisions.  Information  transfer  among  the  agents 
constitutes an important process in decision making. It affects opinion formation, the 
rates of adoption of new technology, and adaption to new policy and environmental 
changes.  
This paper focuses specifically on three parts of an agent-based model for the Rural 
Futures Project in New Zealand. Part one includes options for modelling land and 
other resources such as water, labour and capital in this model. Part two describes the 
incorporation of risk preferences and other personality traits into the decision making 
of the agents in the model. Part three discusses key drivers of the decision making 
process in the areas of information transfer and opinion formation. The fourth and 
final part examines the possibilities presented in parts one to three, discusses the implications for modelling decision making using agent-based approaches and makes 
recommendations regarding a possible starting point for a model of agriculture in 
New  Zealand.  This  includes  discussion  on  how  to  create  heterogeneous  agents 
through modelling different risk preferences and other personality traits, which then 
affect the decision making of the agents in the model.  
 
Part One:  Resources and Commodities 
 
The  purpose  of  this  part  is  to  review  the  approaches  to  simulate  resources  and 
commodities in existing MAS models in agricultural systems.  
Model Structure 
It is useful in any discussion of farming models to first lay out the overall structure of 
agent-based models. As a model of farming, perhaps the most pressing variable in 
question is land. Thus, a discussion of how land is represented in various models will 
guide the initial introduction to the various models, followed by specific discussions 
of  how  different  variables  such  as  water,  labour  and  capital  in  each  model  are 
represented. 
Perhaps the simplest method for modelling land was used in a model of cattleherders 
in  North  Cameroon  (Rouchier,  et  al.,  2001).  In  their  model,  the  authors  were 
interested in replicating the system by which cattleherders in North Cameroon rent 
access  to  grazing from  farmers during the dry  season.  To model this system the 
authors randomly assigned a value (between certain parameters) for the number of 
villages in a given model run, a value for the number of farmers in each village and a 
value  for  the  number  of  fields  for  each  farmer.  Their  model  did  not  attempt  to 
represent land spatially  because it was not of interest to model spatially oriented 
variables. Thus, the simple method for modelling land worked well with their model 
because it paralleled the way in which their cattleherder agents went about renting 
land.  
In  contrast,  Balmann  (1997)  created  a  model  of  farming  that  was  almost  purely 
spatial and represented land using a cellular automata (CA) model. CA models use a 
grid/square structure in which each square is connected to its four neighbours (See 
Figure 1).  
 






Using  CA  to  model  land  requires  a  more  complex  computer  programme  than 
Rouchier et al.’s (2001) non-spatial model. However, its chief advantage is that once 
the ground work has been done to create the CA structure, any number of different 
variables can easily be assigned to each cell. In addition, because each cell has a 
specific location, CA models can be created using GIS data or other regional, spatial 
data.  Recent work in modelling systems in the land based sector has developed a number 
of  models  that  more  explicitly  combine  the  MAS  approach  that  Rouchier,  et  al. 
(2001) used, with the spatial modelling CA approach that Balmann used (1997). By 
combining both, variables can be divided into spatial variables that are assigned to 
cells in a CA and personality/behavioural/decision making variables that are assigned 
to agents in the MAS portion of the model. A close model to our proposed model of 
farming in New Zealand is Berger’s (2001) model of agriculture in Chile. In his 
model he assigned values to each of the cells in the CA matrix for soil quality, water 
supply, land cover/land use, ownership, internal transport costs (from the farmstead), 
marginal productivity or return to land. Unfortunately, Berger does not explicitly set 
out what variables he assigned to the agents in his model, but by implication they 
included at least: the amount of rented land and water rights, calculations for the 
highest  utility  for  each  use  for  each  parcel  of  land,  a  variety  of  behavioural 
constraints to create heterogeneous financial and technical behaviour, and differing 
rates of information adoption, and the ability to exit farming if income drops below a 
certain level.  
Manson (2000) developed a very detailed CA/MAS model of reforestation in the 
Yucatan peninsula of Mexico. He was interested in replicating a theoretical model in 
which the actors, environment and institutions were all mutually interdependent. In 
the CA portion of his model each cell stored values for a wide range of variables and 
empirical  data  on  the  real  land-use  and  land-cover  for  model  verification  and 
calibration. He developed two types of agents for his CA/MAS model, smallholder 
and  institutional  agents.  The  institutional  agents  were  used  to  communicate 
information to the smallholder agents about land tenure and about different markets 
and the smallholder agents’ actions directly determined the land use/cover for each 
CA cell in  the model.  In addition,  the author  tested also  three different  decision 
making models – simple heuristic models, such as, use land near road for three years 
then  leave  fallow;  a  subsistence-oriented  model  whereby  agents  use  information 
about each cell’s agricultural suitability and distance from market to determine the 
location  and  production  type  necessary  to  feed  the  household;  and  genetic 
programme models, ‘calibrated by matching actor land-use histories to an array of 
decision variables from the smallholder survey and GCA grids’ (Manson, 2000). The 
detail that the author included in his model allowed him to incorporate a great deal of 
empirical data regarding soil, land use, etc. 
Balmann,  et  al.  (2002)  created  a  model  of  farming  in  the  German  region  of 
Hohenhole to address changes in European Union farming laws and subsidies. This 
model is similar to the model described above. The CA cells tracked values such as 
the distance from the farmstead, whether the area was suitable for grassland or arable 
farming, and the current use of the land – dairy, cattle, suckler cows, sugar beets. The 
farms in the model acted as the agents and thus made choices about whether to take 
on more loans, rent or buy land, hire addition labour, or alternatively, use labour and 
capital for off-farm employment (exit farming).  
Modelling Resources 
Among the most important commodities which could be addressed when creating a 
model of farming in New Zealand are land, water, labour and capital. There are a 
number  of  existing  agent-based  models  that  together  encompass  a  variety  of 
approaches for modelling all of these variables. In general, each of the resources can 
be  addressed  using  techniques  ranging  from  the  simple  to  the  complex.  Having provided  a  brief  overview  of  a  number  of  different  models,  this  paper  can  now 
compare how different models have dealt with the various commodities that will be 
important in our model. 
Land  
Land is probably the most important resource in a model of farming. There are a 
number of ways in which land has been represented. First, Rouchier, et al. (2001) 
developed a purely non-spatial agent-based model, whereas, Balmann (1997) used a 
model that was almost purely spatial. The rest of the models that the paper examined 
all used a combination of a CA approach to model the spatially oriented data together 
with  an  agent  approach  to  model  differences  in  personality,  risk  behaviour  and 
decision  making  approaches.  Thus,  for  agent  based  modelling  there  are  two 
approaches  in  evidence,  a  non-spatial  approach  and  a  CA  approach  with  a 
preponderance of the modelling being done with a CA/agent-based approach. 
Water  
Water is also an important resource. The reviewed literature ranges from minimalist 
models  to  complex  approaches  to  modelling  water.  A  number  of  the  models 
described above have no explicit model for water. Instead, water availability was 
inferred from other variables that are perhaps more proximal to farming outcomes, 
such as the productivity of a given piece of land, or its suitability for a certain type of 
land use (e.g. Balmann, 1997; Balmann et al., 2002). The most comprehensive model 
is Berger’s (2001) model of farming in Chile, which used an explicit hydrological 
model including variables for locally available freshwater supplies, irrigation and 
return flows and used equations and parameters for these values derived from the 
Chilean Department of Public Works. He also mapped the course of water through 
the CA structure. Finally, this hydrological model was tied into the model for renting 
water rights,  which further contributed to  the hydrological  model by establishing 
precedence in removing water from the system. In contrast, Rouchier, et al. (2001) 
modelled water simply as a value for the number of good or poor watering sites each 
village had access to, which they could then rent to the herdsmen. Between these two 
extremes, Manson (2002) used a simple model for water and assigned values for 
hydrology and precipitation for each of his CA cells. In the end, the modelling of 
water in a system only needs to be as complex as required for the issue at hand but it 
is  useful  to  bear  in  mind  that  every  increase  in  complexity  entails  associated 
additions of error and uncertainty. 
Labour 
Access to labour markets is another variable that distinguished the models described 
above. In some of the models, detailed rules were set, e.g., Balmann (1997) and 
Balmann et al. (2002). In these models the amount of labour at each turn was based 
on  multiple  factors.  First,  each  farm  started  with  an  initial  amount  of  labour 
available. This amount of labour could then range higher as more labour was hired, 
or range lower as the initial labour was put to use in off-farm employment. Finally, 
off-farm employment could consume the entire initial on-farm labour, thus allowing 
the agents ‘leave’ farming altogether. In addition, Balmann allowed for labour units 
to be divisible, e.g., a farmer spends some of his time in off-farm employment. The 
costs of labour and increases in productivity were then used in the linear model by 
which the farm agents made their allocation decisions. Similar to the case with water 
being modelled, some models did not directly take into account access to labour 
markets. If labour is one of the constraints on decision making, then a model that incorporates this may lead to more realistic outcomes. That being said, there are 
clearly areas that could be modelled that are simple enough that there are other, more 
proximal constraints, than labour. In the case of these models, modelling of labour 
would be unnecessary and only add complexity and uncertainty to the final model. 
Capital 
The treatment of capital in the various models falls in line with the treatment of both 
water and land. In some cases capital is a detailed and important part of the decision 
making model for agents and in other cases capital is not included in the model. 
Similar to their modelling of labour, Balmann (1997) and Balmann et  al. (2002) 
again provide more detailed and inclusive models with regard to capital. In their 
models, agents have access to liquid equity capital with its associated opportunity 
costs, short term  loans  and long  term  loans. The maximum  additional long term 
credit a farmer has access to in the model is defined in Equation 1: 
G ≤ (L – E) (1 – v) / v       (1) 
In this equation a minimum reserve is subtracted from liquidity and the sum must be 
higher than the share of the acquisition costs that is financed by the equity capital. 
Their  decision  making  model  then  also  accounts  for  repayment  of  debts,  assets, 
income,  and  long-term  interest  expenses,  to  fully  model  capital.  In  other,  less 
financially oriented models, capital is not accounted for at all. Again, Rouchier, et 
al.’s (2001) simple model of herdsmen did not require the introduction of any form 
of capital market to successfully model the behaviour in which they were interested. 
Markets, Trading, Trading Relationships 
Markets, which can be used for exchanging resources or commodities produced with 
resources, are also important, as are qualifiers to these markets, such as relationships 
between  buyers  and  sellers.  LeBaron  (2006)  provides  a  review  of  four  market 
mechanisms that modellers have used to clear their markets and this paper proposes 
an additional mechanism drawn from the literature reviewed thus far.  
The  first  mechanism  is  a  slow  price  adjustment  mechanism,  which  leads  to  the 
market never arriving at equilibrium. With this type of market, agents put in orders 
for buying and selling, these orders are then summed and the price is increased if 
there is excess  demand and decreased if there is  excess  supply.  LeBaron (2006) 
argues that it is an advantage of the  market being in disequilibrium as it might be a 
more accurate portrayal of the market in reality but he also criticises that the market 
might spend quite a deal of time far from market clearing prices, depending on the 
value set for the change coefficient. A specific example of this kind of market model 
can be found in Day and Huang (1990), who use the following equation to determine 
price: 
pt + 1 = pt + cE(pt)          (2) 
In this equation pt is the price at time zero, c is the adjustment coefficient and E is 
the excess demand. 
The second mechanism used to clear markets is a numerical solution or theoretical 
simplification  that  allows  for  an  easy  analytical  solution  to  a  temporary  market 
clearing  price.  This  mechanism  leads  to  almost  the  exact  reversal  of  one  of  the 
problems above. The benefit of this type of model is that the prices by design always 
clear  the  market,  thus  no  issues  arise  involving  a  market  maker,  inventories  or rationing. However, this type of market model can lead to too much market clearing 
which could be an unrealistic divergence from the actual market in question. This 
mechanism most likely captures the variety of auction based methods that the farm 
models discussed have handled their markets. Brock and Hommes (1998) created an 
asset pricing model with the following equation: 
Rpt = Eht(pt + 1 + yt + 1) - ασ2zst      (3) 
In this equation Rpt is the price in the present turn, which equals the expected price 
(Eht) multiplied by the sum of the future price (pt + 1) and the future increase (yt + 
1), which is then subtracted from the product of risk (α) multiplied by variance (σ2) 
multiplied  by  share  per  person  (zst).  The  authors  then  give  a  variation  of  this 
equation,  which  they  argue,  applies  when  there  are  zero  outside  shares.  In  this 
variation the risk and variance coefficients are removed from the equation: 
Rpt = ΣnhtEht(pt + 1 + yt + 1)       (4) 
The terms in this equation are the same as those above with the addition of Σnht as 
the sum of the number of agents of a given type at a given time. 
The third mechanism for clearing a market is to borrow the idea of order books from 
real world markets and have the agents’ orders crossed using some well defined 
procedure. From a microstructure perspective, this mechanism has the advantage of 
being the most  similar to the way in  which  some markets  operate in  reality, for 
example, financial markets. A drawback to this mechanism is that it requires the 
modeller to include a great deal of institutional details into the market structure and 
into the agents’ learning model. For example, Patelli and Zovko (2005) created a 
model that used the continuous double auction method, the same method widely used 
in modern financial markets. Just as in a true financial market, agents in the model 
could submit orders to buy and/or sell at any point in time. In addition, just as in 
financial markets in practice, both market and limit orders could be placed by agents. 
A market order was defined as a buy or sell order that crossed the opposite best price 
and a limit order was defined as a buy or sell order that did not cross the opposite 
best price. Just as in real financial markets, limit orders were queued and allowed to 
accumulate until  market  orders were placed,  which then removed them  from  the 
queue. Finally, the author’s defined the lowest selling price offered at any point as 
the best ask price a(t), the highest buying price as the best bid price, b(t), and the bid-
ask spread as s(t) = a(t) – b(t) as the gap between the two. 
LeBaron’s (2006) mechanism is to allow trading only through direct contact between 
agents. This mechanism fits well with the model discussed already as many of them 
use their CA structure to determine who their ‘neighbours’ are and then allow trading 
only between neighbours. For some resources this might be the most realistic model 
for a market as well. For example, in models that allow the purchase or rental of 
water rights (e.g. Berger, 2001) the most accurate model could be one in which only 
neighbours are allowed to trade water rights. That is, if the distance between plots 
made trade over longer distances impossible in reality, then there would be little to 
gain in  providing a more complex market mechanism only to support unrealistic 
trades. An example of this mechanism is the urban development/real estate model 
developed by Torrens (2001). In his model the market was based on direct contact 
between two agents—buyer agents first ‘looked at’ a neighbourhood and assessed 
whether that real estate market was in their price range. If the buyer agent decided 
that the market was in their price range they ‘searched’ for a home. To do this, the agent approached locations one by one until it found one in which it and the selling 
agent matched on property preferences (property type, cost, etc.) In this way there 
was no central clearing house or market for the properties in their model.  
There is also a fifth mechanism that is not discussed by LeBaron (2006), which is an 
auction mechanism. This mechanism could be conceived of as a direct trade between 
many agents to many agents and thus, perhaps, a derivation of LeBaron’s (2006) 
fourth  market  mechanism  of  direct  trades  from  one  agent  to  another  agent.  For 
example both Balmann (1997) and Balmann et al. (2002) used auction based models 
for their markets of land purchase and rental. Specifically, each farm sequentially bid 
on plots of nearby land.  A farm’s highest bid for renting (Ry,x) was, ‘the difference 
between the additional gross margin Δ and the transport costs TCy,x (which depend 
on the Euclidean distance between the farm's location and plot (y, z))’  
Ry,x = Δ - TCy,x         (5) 
Bidding on plots continued until bids dropped below zero. Berger (2001) also used 
an auction-based market for his model of Chilean farmers. If a farmer’s shadow price 
for a given plot of land was below the average for that sector they attempted to rent 
out  the  land  and  associated  water  rights.  The  land  and  water  rights  were  then 
transferred to the farmer with the highest shadow price for that specific parcel.  
None of the market  mechanisms  described above allow for any decision making 
beyond those guided by price. Issues like enduring relationships between a given 
farmer and a given supplier could be important factors in determining actual buying 
behaviour. Rouchier, et al. (2001) designed the only model reviewed in this paper to 
use  relationships  as  a  factor  in  the  agents’  decision  making.  In  their  model  of 
herdsmen in North Cameroon, they designed one variation of their model in which 
the agents pursued a strategy attempting to maximize their profits. In a second design 
of  their  model,  agents  pursued  a  strategy  in  which  they  tried  to  maximize  their 
relationships with the various farmers whose land they were renting. They pursued 
this strategy by preferentially asking the farmer with which they had most often been 
able to rent grazing land from in the proceeding rounds. This approach then allowed 
the authors to compare the outcomes for a model in which herdsmen rented based on 
relationships,  with  a  model  in  which  agents  simply  went  to  the  farmer  with  the 
cheapest land to rent. Creating a model that tracked the rent versus refusal decisions 
between  the  herdsmen  and  the  farmers  also  allowed  the  authors  to  examine  and 
define ‘relationships’ in their model.   
Part Two: Modelling Farmer Heterogeneity  
Risk 
This section considers the incorporation of risk preferences and personality traits into 
the decision making of the agents. This does not appear to be a well developed area 
of agent-based models in agriculture. There are a few papers that have modelled risk 
in their agents, thus these equations could be used to construct agents with different 
levels of riskiness. 
Lettau (1997) defines riskiness in his agent based model by defining risk aversion 
using the following equation: 
U(w) = −e−γw         (6) 
In this equation the utility of a given unit of additional wealth decreases as greater 
levels of wealth are attained (declining marginal utility). In this way, the baseline for 
riskiness in his model is somewhat risk averse. The riskiness of an agent can then be 
manipulated  by  varying  the  value  for  the  coefficient  -γ.  In  absolute  terms,  an 
empirically risk neutral agent would have a linear relationship between wealth and 
utility  with  a  slope  of  one.  Risk  seeking  agents  then,  would  have  a  curvilinear 
relationship  wherein  higher levels  of wealth would lead to  even higher levels  of 
utility (See Figure 2).  
 














Lettau’s (1997) equation can be compared to Hoffmann, Kelley, and Evans (2002) 
who define risk with the following equation: 
E(u) = E
2(w) – ασw      (7) In this equation, expected utility is derived from expected wealth minus a second 
term  representing  risk  aversion  (α),  multiplied  by  σw  to  represent  undesirable 
random changes in wealth. Thus, this equation can account both  for agents’ risk 
aversion due to increases in wealth leading to smaller increases in utility at higher 
levels  of  wealth,  and  also  for  agents’  desire  to  limit  random  variations  of  their 
wealth. That is, the second term in the equation accounts for people’s preferences for 
more stable sources of income. A third equation for risk comes from Ishiguro and 
Itoh  (2001),  who  modelled  contract  negotiations  between  pairs  of  agents.    They 
describe their agents (n) as having a von Neumann and Morgenstern utility function 
and give the following: 
Un(zn) – Gn(en)      (8) 
In this equation Un, is the utility of the agent and (en) is the number of elements or 
choices that the agent has available.  
 
Riskiness of agents can also be expressed by agents through the choice between an 
asset which varies in uncertainty and an asset with a fixed return.  A number of 
financial models have modelled simple markets in which agents choose between two 
types of assets. For example, Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), created a hypothetical 
market in which one asset had a fixed dividend (R) and a second asset had a dividend 
(u) defined by the following equation: 
u = θ + є        (9) 
In this equation θ is a random variable which is observable at a cost  and є is a 
random variable which is unobservable. Thus, there are two types of hypothetical 
individuals in the authors’ model, those that purchase information and those that rely 
only on the price of the risky asset. The authors also include an equation defining 
risk by using the utility function (V(Wli)) defined as: 
V(Wli) = -exp(-aWli), a > 0     (10) 
In this  equation a is  the coefficient for risk aversion and Wli is the individual’s 
wealth, determined by the following equation: 
Wli = RMi + uXi        (11) 
R, in this equation, is the return on the risk free asset, and u is the dividend of the 
risky asset and Mi and Xi represent the amount of risk free and risky assets held by 
the agent. Another example of a market in which a risky and risk free asset are 
modeled can be found in LeBaron’s (2006) presentation of his work with the Santa 
Fe  Artificial  Stock  Market  (Earlier  descriptions  of  the  Santa  Fe  Artificial  Stock 
Market can be found in Arthur et al. (1997) and LeBaron, Arthur & Palmer (1999)).  
In this hypothetical market a risk free asset is given the return (R) and a risky asset’s 
dividend dt is: 
dt = d + p(dt-1 – d) + єt      (12) 
Where єt is Gaussian, independent and identically distributed and p was set to 0.95. 
In addition, this model used a sophisticated learning and forecasting model. Agents 
use forecasting equations to try to predict the future price of a risky asset.  At the end 
of each period, agents have a probability (p) to change their current set of forecasting rules (p is a parameter set for each model run).  Learning for an agent starts with the 
worst performing 15 per cent of the agent’s forecasting rules being dropped. These 
are  then  replaced  using  a  modified  genetic  algorithm  with  both  crossover  and 
mutation. During crossover, parts of rules are swapped for the different parts of an 
existing rule. In the course of mutation, parts of a rule are changed randomly and 
thus result in a rule that might not be present in the rest of the population.    
Risk and other forms of ‘personality’ that can be imbedded into agents’ behaviour 
highlight the benefit of an agent based model as a whole because they allow for the 
creation  of  variables  which  allow  for  more  accurate  modelling  of  real  world 
phenomenon by mimicking the behaviour of actors in the real world. Modelling the 
riskiness of agents can allow for emergent properties based on different forms of 
riskiness to develop in the model.  
Once a decision has been made as to which equation to use to define riskiness, it is a 
simple  step  to  generate  heterogeneous  agents  by  either  randomly  or  empirically 
assigning different values for the modifying coefficient or exponent. Defining and 
manipulating the riskiness of agents allows the modeller to use risk to drive different 
processes in a model.  
Decision Making 
There are a number of approaches to represent decision-making in MAS models in 
the land-based sector but they can be divided in two categories: behaviour heuristics 
and optimisation (Schreinemachers and Berger, 2006)  
Behaviour Heuristics  
Most agent decision making models have been represented as behaviour heuristics. 
Heuristics are implemented in MAS models using decision trees. They are intuitive 
and  mostly  simple  rules,  also  called  ‘condition-action  rules’,  ‘stimulus-response 
rules’, or ‘if-then rules’. These rules are easy to validate by interacting with farmers 
and  experts.  Its  implementation  needs  the  modeller  to  identify  (1)  important 
decisions, (2) correct sequence of decisions to be made and (3) saturation level for 
decisions.  That  is,  the  modeller  needs  also  to  know  the  number  of  options  at  a 
decision making level, and the criteria that decision-makers use to chose one option 
instead of another. These criteria can be determined by sociological research, data-
mining  of  survey  data,  participatory  modelling  and  role-play  games,  laboratory 
experiment and group discussions (Schreinemachers and Berger, 2006).  
Most heuristics build on the concept of bounded rationality (Simon,1991), which 
refers to the limited cognitive capabilities of humans in making decisions, described 
as a search process guided by rational principles. That is, the decision-maker is a 
satisficer seeking a satisfactory solution rather than the optimal one. In rural systems, 
farmers  typically  use  a  large  number  of  heuristics  in  decision  making,  perhaps 
because  of  the  great  uncertainties  of  natural  phenomena.  The  weaknesses  of 
heuristics are its lack of information for alternatives, and the difficulty of coping with 
large  numbers  of  rules,  and  with  heterogeneity  in  system  inputs  and  outputs 
(Schreinemachers and Berger, 2006). 
Optimisation 
Many  MAS  models  in  land  use  research  use  optimisation  in  decision-making.  
Optimisation can be used for a normative purpose to re-allocate resources to gain a higher  level  of  goal  satisfaction  by  eliminating  inefficiencies,  or  for  a  positive 
purpose to replicate or simulate a real-world resource allocation. 
In  contrast  to  the  bounded  rationality  in  behaviour  heuristics,  it  is  assumed  that 
decision-makers are rational optimisers with foresight. They are able to process large 
amounts  of  information  on  all  feasible  alternatives  and  select  the  best  one. 
Optimisation  seeks  to  identify  inefficiencies  in  structural  factors  external  to  the 
decision-makers. Optimisation models can be calibrated to the observed behaviour 
by  carefully  representing  all  the  opportunities  and  constraints  in  the  model 
(Schreinemachers and Berger, 2006).  
Optimisation  in  decision  making  can  be  implemented  in  a  MAS  model  using  a 
variety of optimising algorithms, one of which is Mathematical Programming (MP). 
This method is widely used in optimising and decision-making in MAS models in the 
land based sector (e.g., Balmann, 1997; Berger, 2001; Becu et al 2003, Happe 2004, 
2004). This approach involves constructing objective functions (e.g., cash income, 
food, leisure time, N-leaching, GHG emission) of various activities under various 
constraints, and finds a best solution by solving the equations. Agent heterogeneity is 
represented  by  specifying  different  constraints.  The  advantages  of  MP  are  that 
heterogeneity (farmer personalities and farm conditions) can easily be represented 
and a large number of decisions can be incorporated. In addition, it can well capture 
economic  trade-offs  in  resource  allocation  because  it  considers  various  decisions 
simultaneously and in coherence (land use options are dependent of relative resource 
endowment) and it is suitable for the assessment of the quantitative impact of policy 
interventions.  Optimisation  addresses  inefficiencies  in  structural  characteristics 
external to decision makers, so has clearer policy relevance (Schreinemachers and 
Berger,  2006).  A  critical  feature  of  optimisation  through  MP  is  that  it  is  often 
criticised as being unrealistic, not describing the way real people think (Todd and 
Gigerenzer, 2000), as indicated by the bounded rationality.  That is, people also think 
of  factors  such  as  risk,  uncertainty,  limited  information  and  non-profit  goals. 
However, risk can be incorporated using chance constrained programming (Hardaker 
et el. 1997, 2004), and non-profit goals can be modelled either by a ‘utility’ type 
program or through Boolean or mixed integer models.  
Genetic  Programming  (GP)  is  an  evolutionary  algorithm-based  optimisation 
methodology  inspired  by  biological  evolution  to  find  computer  programs  that 
perform a user-defined task. It is used in various complex optimisation and search 
problems.  The  SYPRIA  (Manson  2005)  model  used  GP  in  modelling  decision-
making  for  assessing  effects  of  land  use  policy  changes.  It  specifies  a  response 
variable (agricultural land use in 1992) as a function of a set of predictor variables 
(1987  environmental  and  institutional  variables)  chosen  for  their  effects  as 
hypothesised by land use theory. The weaknesses of GP are the subject of continuing 
research because they can be difficult to interpret and there are dangers in conflating 
human decision making with biologically inspired models of computer programming 
(Manson 2005). 
Another optimisation technique is Artificial neural networks (ANN), an optimisation 
technique  which  is  a  data  modelling  tool  capable  of  capturing  and  representing 
complex  input/output  relationships.  Development  of  neural  network  technology 
stemmed  from  the  desire  to  originate  an  artificial  system  that  could  perform 
intelligent tasks similar to those performed by the human brain. Neural networks 
resemble brain function in that they acquire knowledge through learning, and store the knowledge within inter-neuron connection strengths. The most common neural 
network model is the multilayer perceptron (MLP) which is used to approximate 
functions.  MLP is also known as a supervised network. It requires inputs paired with 
desired output in order to learn. The goal of this type of network is to create a model 
that correctly maps the input to the output using historical data with the goal of using 
the model to predict future outcomes. Optimisation using ANN has potential to be 
used for optimisation in decision making of land use. A possible limitation of an 
ANN, as applied to land use decisions, is when the problem solution space changes 
of over time, i.e. the rules of the game change. The model is constructed from purely 
priori  knowledge,  and  therefore  may  not  find  an  appropriate  solution  given  the 
contextual alterations. 
Using  a  comprehensive  approach  placed  at  the  right  position  on  the  continuum 
between heuristic and optimising behaviour is vital to simulate decision-making, and 
it is closely related with the questions that the model is designed to answer and/or the 
targeted model users. More behaviour heuristics should be used if the model is used 
by social, economic and environmental policy makers to explore the farmers’ actual 
responses to institutional and environmental changes (e.g., objective of Rural Futures 
project). Otherwise, if the model is to provide a tool or modelling platform to support 
farmers  in  making  decisions  in  front  of  economic  and  environmental  changes, 
incorporation of optimisation algorithms can be useful. 
Information Transfer  
The interaction of farm agents through communication networks is an integral part of 
decision making.  Communication lowers the uncertainties for agents (Rogers 1995 
in Berger et al 2006), but slows down decision-making processes (e.g., adoption rate 
of innovations, Berger, 2001). 
In a MAS model, agents are explicit entities. Inter-agent communication can either 
be direct (agent-to-agent) or indirect (agent-environment-agent).  It can be explicitly 
implemented  using  message  passing.  It  can  also  be  very  helpful  to  clarify 
communication among agents using the Unified Modelling Language (UML) to draw 
sequential activity diagram of major agents (e.g., in Harpe et al 2006; Schlüter & 
Pahl-Wostl, 2007).  
The reasoning behind modelling this information transfer and its associated network 
structure is to replicate information sourced from other agents in a social network 
which is one of the key drivers of an agent’s decision making. This driver plays two 
key roles, firstly for creating a basis for social comparison  (Festinger, 1954) and 
secondly as a source of information and opinion (Anderson, 1962).  
The  underlying  network  structure  used  for  information  transfer  between  agents, 
otherwise called a social network, is important (Milgram, 1967; Watts, 1998). Social 
networks  exhibit  qualities  of  ‘connectedness’  that  have  properties  of  both  highly 
uniform networks, e.g. lattices, in that groups of nodes are interconnected; and of 
highly random networks in which the distance between any two nodes is quite short 
(i.e., six degrees of separation, Watts, 2003) 
While  difficult  to  validate,  information  transfer  via  a  social  network  plays  an 
important role in agribusiness decision making and as such deserves consideration. 
The  information  passed  via  these  types  of  network  form  the  basis  of  social 
comparison as a performance metric as well as a driver for system change and/or 
adoption.  Opinion formation 
Information transfer in an agent based model can be seen as being closely related to 
opinion  formation  (Wu,  2004).    An  agent  must  first  amass  information  before 
opinions can be formed. In the context of an agent based model it is common for a 
proportion of the information to come via other agent in the system. For this section, 
opinion formation is defined as a specific process of information utilisation both by 
individuals and groups. 
Models of opinion formation among communities of agents are among some of the 
earliest  attempts  to  model  complex  systems  (von  Neumann,  1966)  and  are  tied 
closely to early information/diffusion theory (Turing, 1952). The majority of these 
models  have  been  continued  to  be  based  on  cellular  automata  (one  or  two 
dimensional). 
The Sznajd model (Sznajd-Weron and Sznajd, 2004) uses a dual Ising spin model to 
describe  social  influence  as  it  applies  to  political  attitude.  In  the  model  political 
attitude  was  viewed  as  a  two  dimensional  continuous  space  based  on  ‘traits’  of 
personal  and  economic  freedom.  This  model  goes  some  way  toward  modelling 
ability of a population to reach a consensus (or not) based on the global tolerance 
factor. A potential weakness was identified in the model abstraction is that they may 
lead to complete consensus (Sznajd, 2004) which in many situations is unrealistic.  
Macro level opinion formation and the underlying micro level behaviours are tied 
into a feedback loop whereby an individual’s opinion is both driven by and forms 
part of the macro level opinions (or social norms). In its simplest form, the sharing of 
these opinions can be described as a model of knowledge diffusion. 
These opinions play an important role in three key drivers of an agent’s behaviour; 
  Preferences e.g. conforming to social norms 
  Perception e.g. to predict future performances of both self and society 
  Opportunities e.g. to improve one’s relative position in society 
A number of other models can be used to describe various forms of information 
transfer  such  as  epidemic  spreading  (unwilling  transfer),  rumour  spreading  or 
diffusion of innovation (willing transfer) (Boccaletti et al 2006). Game theory has 
also been used to simulate interactions among decision-makers (e.g., Osborne 2002).  
Part Three: Suggestions for a MAS Model  
Previous parts of this literature review suggest that there are a wide variety of models 
available as starting points for a model of agriculture in New Zealand.  Thus, the 
purpose of this section is to suggest a possible starting point for the model.  First, this 
review indicates that a two-part model including both  a multi agent  (MAS) sub-
model and a cellular automata (CA) sub-model is the most suitable for agricultural 
models.  In this way, variables can be divided into those linked to specific locations 
and thus assigned to land in the CA sub-model, and those linked to decision making 
and thus assigned to agents in the MAS sub-model. 
With regard to the MAS sub-model, the prior research suggests that agents should be 
heterogeneous in terms of risk preferences and the use of prior information (myopia). 
The research team should also discuss other decision rules or strategies that could be 
included in the model. With regard to the CA components, it appears that land should be modelled spatially 
with variables for different production possibilities. That is, that each unit of land 
should  include  values  for  potential  outputs  for  dairy,  meat,  and  forestry.    The 
research team should discuss other possible land uses that should be modelled.  In 
addition,  a  discussion  should  be  held  regarding  the  potential  need  for  modelling 
water  in  the  model  and  the  potential  need  for  modelling  distance  in  the  model 
(distance being distance from farmstead to different fields and/or distance from the 
farm to market). These aspects can be treated as separate elements in the model, or 
simply implied by the relative productivity of CA units. 
The production from various land uses can be sold based on exogenously determined 
prices. That is, that a sub-model for a commodities market is probably not necessary 
to adequately model agriculture in New Zealand, given its export focus. 
With regard to modelling decision-making it can be either modelled using simple 
rules of behaviour heuristics, or using optimisation algorithms, or a combination of 
the two. Selection of the approach depends on the questions the model is designed to 
answer, with the targeted model users in mind. More behaviour heuristics should be 
incorporated  if  the  model  is  used  by  social,  economic  and  environmental  policy 
makers to  explore farmers’ responses to  institutional  and environmental  changes.  
Conversely,  if  the  model  is  designed  to  support  the  decision  making  of  farm 
managers, the incorporation of optimisation algorithms can be useful to help farm 
managers expand their bounds of rationality and make informed decisions ahead of 
economic and environmental changes. Information transfer among the agents can be 
explicitly modelled both to introduce new information and technology adoption as 
well  as  for  heterogeneous  goal  setting/measurement  of  the  agents  as  a  function 
representation  of  social  influence.  An  agent’s  responses  to  new  information  and 
opinion formation can be modelled by using appropriate network dynamic models.  
By overlaying these simulated agents – constructed based on primary data on farmer 
behaviour  –  on  a  cellular  structure  that  represents  key  features  of  the  natural 
landscape  of  New  Zealand,  it  should  be  possible  to  investigate  the  emergent 
properties of the country’s farming sector. In particular, the response of this complex 
system  to  simulated  future  shocks,  such  as  policy  shifts  or  climate  change,  may 
provide useful information for farmers, the sector, and policy-makers. 
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